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Competition law has in the past tended to see suspiciously the 
protection of trademark as directly opposed to the goals of competition law. 
As this paper shows this view has been abandoned and substituted by a 
more synthetic approach in which the goals of trademark law and 
competition law are not incompatible but may be pursued conjunctly. The 
paper discusses the importance and practical feasibility of striking a 
balance between competition law and trademark rights, with a specific 
attention to the specificities of trademarks. The paper will focus on the 
issue of the compatibility between the goals of trademark law and 
competition, and by analyzing the competition case law it provides a 
careful insight of how the balance is struck in the decisional practice. The 
paper shows that the “internalisation” of competition law considerations 
when dealing with trademark issues and vice versa certainly affects the 
reasoning of the courts. The choice of considering an issue from the point 
of view of either trademark law or competition law empowers the courts to 
address the same issue in a completely different manner and come to a 
different conclusion. It remains to be assessed whether, in future cases, the 
characterization of a case as an IP or a competition law case by the courts 
will also have a bearing, given the profound consequences for the structure 
of the analysis that is performed by the adjudicator, and, in turn, on the 
final outcome of the case of such a choice. 
* The author would like to express his gratitude to Dr Claudia Lemus for her excellent research
assistance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION – THE TENSION BETWEEN COMPETITION LAW AND IP
RIGHTS 
The relationship between competition law and intellectual property 
rights is not only very close, but a very intricate one.1 One of the ultimate – 
indirect – goals of these two areas of law is the same: favoring progress and 
innovation in any specific industry.2 The way in which this goal is pursued, 
however, is radically different, if not opposite.3 While competition law is 
aimed at promoting the freedom of competition in the market and, with 
some exceptions in specific markets, deregulation, the aim of intellectual 
property law is to protect the IP-right holders and, as a result, limiting 
competition against them whenever they satisfy specific criteria.4 
Trademark law is aimed at protecting, on the one hand, the public, 
because it acts as an indicator of origin and a guarantee of quality and, in 
1. Steven D. Anderman, The Competition Law/IP ‘interface’: An introductory note in THE
INTERFACE BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMPETITION POLICY 1 
(Steven D. Anderman ed., 2007).  
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See Ioannis Lianos, Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights: Is the Property
Rights’ Approach Right?, in CAMBRIDGE YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LEGAL STUDIES 153 (2006). 
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doing so, reassures the consumers that they are getting the products they 
want to get,5 and, on the other hand, the owner of the trademark, who “has 
spent energy, time and money in presenting to the public the product [so 
that] he is protected in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates 
and cheats”.6 However, with the development of trademark law and 
international exchanges, the scope of trademark has expanded steadily, to 
the point that some commentators have criticized the excessive protection 
that trademark owners currently enjoy, with trademarks granted too easily 
and with rights attached to them becoming too pervasive.7 The reasons for 
such expansion were mainly found in the process of conceptualization of 
the trademark as a “property”. This has led to the IP right holders to enjoy a 
wide array of safeguards, including at the constitutional level in the EU and 
in the Member States.8 
This enhanced status might have, in turn, come at the expenses of 
either other undertakings in the market or the public interest itself.9 Within 
this last category of conflicting interests it is possible to also include 
competition law and the pursuance of its immediate goals: namely, 
consumer welfare, efficiency, as well as, in the EU, market integration. In 
fact, some commentators contend that the interface between intellectual 
property and competition law is biased in favor of IP rights,10 and that this 
is mainly due previously mentioned predominance that is attributed to the 
safeguard of trademarks intended as properties. 
Being the purposes of intellectual property rights undeniably 
important and their role not negligible, the interaction between the two 
fields of law is as much frequent as it is complex. One of the most relevant 
areas of intersection between intellectual property and competition law has 
historically been that of standard essential patents, and certainly it is not a 
casualty that in this area of law commitment decisions under Article 9 of 
5. Jennifer Davis, To protect or serve? European trademark law and the decline of the public
interest, 25 (4) E.I.P.R. 183, 180-187 (2003). 
6. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946).
7. Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Problem with Intellectual Property Rights: Subject Matter
Expansion, 13 Yale J.L. & TECH 45-46 (2011); Irene Calboli, Trademark Assignment “With 
Goodwill”: A Concept Whose Time has Gone, 57 FLA. L. REV. 771, 774-75 (2005); Mark A. Lemley, 
The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687 (1999). 
8. At the EU level, see the first additional Protocol of the European Convention of Human
Rights. 
9. Davis, supra note 5, at 183.
10. See Ioannis Lianos, Competition Law and Intellectual Property (IP) Rights: Analysis, Cases
and Materials, in COMPETITION LAW 20 (Ioannis Lianos et al eds. 2017). Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2863814 or http://dx.doi.org/10/2139/ssrn.2863814 
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Regulation (EC) 1/2003 have been particularly popular.11A commitment 
decision, while requesting the undertaking to put an end to the infringement 
and eliminate the restraint to competition in the market, is not a finding of 
infringement.12 As such, the Commission decision to make the 
commitments binding is less conclusive, also due to the great input given 
by the interested company in its taking, compared to a regular prohibition 
decision under Article 7 Regulation (EC) 1/2003.13 
Cases like Rambus,14 Samsung15 and Huawei16 show how important, 
yet difficult, it is to strike the right balance between, on the one side, the 
preservation of free competition and the need to ensure that all companies 
are provided with the opportunity to compete on a level playing field for 
the benefit of consumers and, on the other side, making sure that all 
companies have an incentive to improve constantly their products because 
they will receive an appropriate and satisfying reward for their efforts. If no 
royalties were attributed to the standard essential patent creator, there 
would not be any incentive for it to create a patent in the first place. 
However, high royalty fees have serious consequences on the possibility 
for competitors to enter a specific market and, as a result, may create 
significant barriers to entry. This results in difficulties found in balancing 
IP protection with competition law. 
A further reason of complication in striking the right balance between, 
on the one hand, the defense of the right to distinguish the products and 
protecting the character and the reputation which it conveys and, on the 
other, ensuring that firms operate in an optimally working free market 
economy is given by the respective interplay each of this subject matter has 
with innovation and new economies. 
There is an ongoing and lively debate on the ways in which 
competition law should spur innovation. However, the necessity for the 
debate is itself controversial. It is useful to recall the key issues of the 
interplay between competition, IP rights and innovation. Purists might 
consider that, in principle, competition law should not play any active role 
11. Article 9 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32003R0001 
12. Article 13 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32003R0001 
13. Article 7 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32003R0001 
14. Case COMP/38.636, Rambus, OJ C 30, 6.2.2010, p. 17–18
15. Case AT.39939, Samsung, Enforcement of UMTS standard essential patents, OJ C 350, 
4.10.2014, p. 8–10. 
16. Case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp., ZTE Deutschland GmbH,,
ECLI:EU: C:2015:477. 
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in fostering innovation and that the market should be left to evolve without 
interferences.17 According to a widely held view amongst economists, 
however, there is a strong link between innovation and social welfare.18 It 
is generally thought that innovation needs to be encouraged because in a 
free-market economy those companies which invest in innovation are not 
adequately incentivized.19 This is due to the fact that the social return on 
innovation that they get exceeds their individual return.20 According to one 
of the most famous studies of the economist Kenneth J. Arrow, Nobel 
Memorial Prize winner in Economic Science in 1972 with John R. Hicks, 
there are prices which bring all markets into a “general”, simultaneous 
equilibrium, whereby every item produced at the equilibrium price is 
voluntarily purchased.21 The corollary of this proposition is that 
competitive markets are efficient. In continuity with Adam Smith, Kenneth 
J. Arrow demonstrated that the operation of the invisible hand of market
competition benefits society22 and, in a subsequent study, he demonstrated
how “the incentive to invent is less under monopolistic than under
competitive conditions but even in the latter case it will be less than is
socially desirable”.23
As a result, 
companies will underinvest in both product and process innovation 
because they may not be able to fully appropriate the value they generate 
to consumers, because their investments may generate technological 
externalities that they cannot monetize and/or because their innovations 
are copied before they had obtained an appropriate rate of return. Recent 
17. Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolisation Standards, 56 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 2,
294-305 (2003); Louis. Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARVARD LAW 
REVIEW, 1817 (1984). 
18. Stephen Haber, Patents and the Wealth of Nations, 23 GEORGE MASON LAW REVIEW, 811
(2015). 
19. Robert D. Atkinson, Stephen Ezell, and Luke A. Stewart, The Global Innovation Policy Index
(Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, March 2012), 69-71, 
https://itif.org/publications/2012/03/08/global-innovation-policy-index; William Davidson and Donald 
McFetridge, International Technology Transactions and the Theory of Firm, 32 JOURNAL OF 
INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, 253-64 (1984). 
20. Jorge Padilla, Innovation, Competition and Economic Growth – An economist’s viewpoint,
Presentation to the Association of European Competition Law Judges, Compass Lexecon 1-2 (June 
2016). 
21. Michael M. Weinstein, Kenneth Arrow, Nobel-Winning Economist whose Influence Spanned
Decades, Dies at 95, N. Y. TIMES, (February 21, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/21/business/economy/kenneth-arrow-dead-nobel-laureate-in-
economics.html (last visited May 16, 2020). 
22. See id.
23. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609-626 (Universities-
National Bureau Committee for Economic Research, Committee on Economic Growth of the Social 
Science Research Council ed., 1962). 
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empirical evidence shows that the social return on innovation indeed 
exceeds its private return. As a consequence, there is too little 
innovation.24 
One of the main consequences of these assumptions is that innovation 
needs to be fostered to ensure productivity growth, increased employment 
rate and wider consumer choice. Since one typical vehicle of innovation are 
intellectual property rights, the use of competition law to foster innovation 
is especially controversial because of the delicate fine-tuning exercise that 
the integration between these two -sometimes opposing- forces require. 
This paper will focus on the importance and practical feasibility of 
striking this balance, particularly regarding the specificities of trademarks. 
It will first examine the issue of the compatibility between the goals of 
trademark law and competition from a general perspective, and then move 
on to analyze the competition case law to provide a better insight of how 
the balance is struck in the decisional practice of the European Courts. This 
paper will conclude with an analysis of whether and in which 
circumstances competition law considerations trump trademark protection 
considerations.  Although this paper will only cover the current academic 
debate in the EU jurisdiction, the US jurisdiction will be also considered 
where appropriate. 
2. THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF THE IP/COMPETITION LAW
TENSION25 
In this section, a theoretical background is developed against which 
the practical analysis of the case law can be embedded. First, a general 
overview of the doctrinal discussion is given. Second, a framework for a 
theory that addresses the tension between IP and competition law will be 
developed. 
2.1. The theoretical background in the doctrine 
Even though there has been a dispute on whether IP rights are 
justified, the utilitarian explanation seems to remain the consensus for 
24. Padilla, supra note 20, at 1-2.
25. This tension between IP and competition law in the UK and Europe has been highlighted by
the President of the UK Supreme Court, in an article: Lord Neuberger, Intellectual Property in the 
United Kingdom and Europe, 36 (11) E.I.P.R. 693 (2014). This section draws from: The 
pharmaceutical sector between Patent Law and Competition Law in UK, in COMPETITION AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, 
307 – 344 (Gabriella Muscolo & Giovanni Pitruzzella eds., 2016). 
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justifying IP rights.26 In this line, “the essence and main objective of 
intellectual property rights is to direct private interest towards the 
achievement of the community goal of greater innovation and increasing 
economic welfare.”27 
The need to analyze the justification for granting a patent is triggered 
by the tension between patent law and competition law.28 It is intensified 
because patents are considered to be property rights, which results in a 
strong legal protection that ‘could lead to a weak application or even non-
application of competition law.’29In the pharmaceutical sector though, it 
seems that currently competition authorities ensure that competition law is 
applied in patent related cases. Therefore, even if patents are regarded as 
being strong property rights, competition law still seems to break this veil 
of protection to the benefit of consumers and competitive markets. Viewing 
IP rights as equals to property rights therefore is not fully relevant in the 
pharmaceutical sector. 
IP rights and especially patents are special because they confer 
exclusionary rights upon the holder, which fits uncomfortably with 
competition values.30 If one follows the view, that intellectual property 
rights should not be regarded as quasi-physical property rights but rather as 
“a form of industry specific regulation,”31 the “absence of a continuous 
relationship” between IP and competition and the isolation of the two 
disciplines can be overcome. More specifically, in order to overcome the 
“disconnect” between IP and competition one should abandon the view that 
the two disciplines are completely autonomous;  and on the contrary 
introduce a lively and continuous open relationship. Others consider that is 
wrong to make intellectual property rights equivalent with normal property 
rights, suggesting that IP rights should be seen through the lens of liability 
rules instead.32 
26. Ioannis Lianos, A Regulatory Theory of IP: Implications for Competition Law 2 (Univ. Coll.
London, Ctr. For Law, Econ. & Soc’y. Working Paper Series 1/2008, Nov. 2008). Available at 
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/research-paper-series/research-papers/cles-1-2008. 
27. See id. at. 2.
28. See id. at. 4.
29. See id.
30. Ian S. Forrester, Regulating Intellectual Property Via Competition? Or Regulating
Competition Via Intellectual Property? Competition and Intellectual Property: Ten Years On, The 
Debate Still Flourishes in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2005: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN 
COMPETITION LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 61 (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Isabela 
Atanasiu eds., 1st ed. 2007). 
31. Lianos, supra note 10, at 7.
32. Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should property or liability rules govern information, 85
TEX. L. REV. 783 (2006). 
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Another starting point to explain the role of IP when confronted with 
competition is a theory of separation designed from an economic point of 
view by Régibeau and Rockett, which highlights the distinguishing 
functions of the two disciplines.33 The function of IP law should only be 
the assignment and defense of IP whereas the function of competition law 
should only be the scrutiny of the use of IP rights34 This theoretical 
approach might harmonize the tension between IP and competition as it 
sets clear boundaries for each discipline to prevent conflict. This theory 
also seems to reverberate in the argument that competition law should not 
be applied to situations where the patents are valid from the point of view 
of patent law.35 However, even if patent holders observe a regulatory 
system of patent law, there are scenarios where this theory of separation 
falls short of being a remedy for possible anti-competitive harm.36 
These different regulatory theories of IP might be used in this context 
to exemplify and to analyze in how far competition law and IP related 
arguments shall be taken into account in a given case and, more 
importantly, to what extent they should be weighed and put on the 
balance.37 
2.2. A theory of practical concordance between IP and competition law 
We suggest a theory that draws heavily on the insights of 
constitutional law known as the theory of practical concordance. This 
theory tries to balance the interests of IP law and competition law to an 
optimal extent. The theory of practical concordance (‘Praktische 
Konkordanz’) developed by K. Hesse in the framework of constitutional 
law tries to balance different colliding fundamental rights and has as its aim 
to come to a harmonious balancing of the two conflicting rights by 
enabling each right to fulfil its optimal efficacy.38 
33. Pierre Regibeau and Katharine Rockett, The Relationship between Intellectual Property Law
and Competition Law: An economic Approach in THE INTERFACE BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND COMPETITION POLICY, 2 (Steven D. Anderman ed., 2007). 
34. See id.
35. Josef Drexl, AstraZeneca and the EU Sector Inquiry: When Do Patent Filings Violate
Competition Law?, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property & Competition Law Research Paper 
[1], (2012); see also JOSEF DREXL, AstraZeneca and the EU sector inquiry: when do patent filings 
violate competition law? in PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION, COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW – A 
TRILATERAL PERSPECTIVE 294 (Josef Drexl & Na Ri Lee eds., 2013).  
36. Pierre Regibeau & Katharine Rockett, Revising the Technology Transfer Guidelines report
prepared for the European Commision 10 (2012). The report indicates that ‘even behaviour that follows 
the letter of IP regulations can be found to be abusive if a patent-holder essentially “games” the IP 
system with the intent and/or effect of hampering competition’. 
37. Lianos, supra note 26, at 6.
38. Konrad Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 317
(1999). 
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Applied to the tension between IP law and competition law, this 
theory implies that authorities and courts should try to allow the maximum 
possible unfolding of the respective interests of the discipline and decide 
the case by enabling each right to profit from optimal efficacy.39 This 
means on the one hand, that IP rights should not be touched in their core 
value, which is at the heart of and the very reason for applying for and 
granting patents. The present theory therefore suggests that for each of the 
two disciplines, there exist three different sets of stages of values.40 This 
three-stage model could be described as similar to the model of the earth. 
First, there exist core values that are immovable and fixed. On the patent 
law side, this means that the patent cannot be modified in its existence by 
any competition law consideration.41 On the competition law side this 
means that the core values of the competition rules, such as the abuse of a 
dominant position, can never be justified by patent law.42 
Second, in exceptional circumstances it is plausible that the goal of 
one discipline could be overridden by a superior goal of the other 
discipline.43 This is the crucial stage where the balancing act usually is 
taking place and where most of the cases at the frontier of IP and 
competition will be situated.44 On the patent side this means that the full 
protection of the patent system cannot help the patent holder to justify a 
potentially abusive behavior under the competition rules.45 However, with 
regard to the middle values, it needs to be taken into account that under this 
balancing, competition law does not touch patent law in its core value but 
rather in line with the jurisprudence of the ECJ, only competition law 
sanctions the use of the patent.46 
Third and finally, there are outer values that are less important and not 
essential for the existence of the rights governed by the discipline, meaning 
they can be abandoned due to the necessities of another discipline.47 For IP 







45. Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 UNIVERSITY OF
PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 3, 768-769 (January 2002). 
46. Floris O. W. Vogelaar, The Compulsory License of Intellectual Property Rights Under the EC
Competition Rules: an Analysis of the Exception to the General Rule of Ownership Immunity From 
Competition Rules, 6 THE COMPETITION LAW REVIEW 117 (2009). 
47. See Hesse supra note 38, at 317.
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patent holder, it is justified by the necessity to incentivize innovation.48 On 
the competition law side, this means that competition law is not precluded 
from being applicable but must tolerate the granting of IP rights.49 
In order to exemplify this theory, we use the typical pay-for-delay 
scenario where the originator company who holds a patent and a secondary 
process patent for a drug enters into patent settlement agreements with 
generic companies in order to prevent them from entering the market.50 
The Commission is not interested in attacking the validity of the 
patent itself, and therefore does not question the core values of IP. The 
Commission is rather concerned about the use of the patent. However, it 
identifies that the limitations imposed on the generic companies in the 
framework of the patent settlement agreement remain within the scope of 
the patent, such as not entering the market with the generic version against 
a payment that is close to the profits that could have been generated by 
entering the market. It therefore recognizes that the patent covers the 
practices of the dominant company. However, in the present scenario we 
are confronted with the second stage of the middle-values, where the 
practice of the pharmaceutical company seems to be within the boundaries 
of the IP discipline but is in conflict with the competition rules. We 
therefore would need an overriding goal or exceptional circumstances. 
In Lundbeck, the Commission considered that originator and generic 
companies were potential competitors, that the agreement led the generic 
companies to limit its independent efforts to compete on the market, and 
that the incentives to compete were reduced by the value transfer from 
originator to generic companies.51  The overriding goal in the specific facts 
of the case was to enable market entry and maintain competitive efforts in 
the market for the specific drug.52 Therefore, the balancing test needs to 
solve this dilemma. Using the model of the three different stages, by 
sanctioning the behavior under the competition rules, the competition 
authority does not interfere with the core values of IP. It merely is 
concerned with the anticompetitive behavior and usage of the patent 
system, which violates the rules prohibiting an abuse of a dominant 
48. FREDERIC M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 621-624 (3d ed. 1990). 
49. James Turney, Defining the Limits of the EU Essential Facilities Doctrine on Intellectual
Property Rights: The Primacy of Securing Optimal Innovation, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 
180, 190 (2005). 
50. Based on the Lundbeck decision of the European Commission.
51. Case T-472/13 Lundbeck v Commission.
52. See id.
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position. The limit imposed on the behavior of the patent holder is therefore 
posed by the competition rules. 
Practitioners and enforcers can embrace this theory as a tool to help 
them decide whether the IP or the competition narrative shall prevail in a 
given case. 
3. THE “COMPETITION PLUS” PERSPECTIVE AND THE IP/COMPETITION
DILEMMA WITHIN A BROADER ECONOMIC POLICY CONTEXT 
This section suggests a policy framework positioning patent law 
within a competitive market. This will take a “competition plus” 
perspective, considering not only competition law in the strict sense but 
also the need for open and innovative competitive markets. 
Competition law does not stand alone in the law system but is 
embedded in the broader context of the economic law and policy. Neither 
the UK or the EU have, as their single economic policy, a goal to maintain 
competitive markets and to ensure that the competition rules are observed. 
On the contrary, the UK and the EU are concerned with innovation, 
economic growth and stability, jobs and the economy as a whole. Within 
this policy framework, IP and competition policy have their place. For 
example, competition law sometimes has to make way because of bigger 
economic policy goals53 such as the stability of the UK financial system, as 
is evidenced by the ‘public interest intervention’ in merger law used in the 
merger case Lloyds TSB/ HBOS54 
This can also be seen in the way European competition law and policy 
is situated in the Juncker-Commission, where competition policy has been 
positioned within the broader goal of growth and economic stability.55 In 
this view, competition policy serves different goals.56 The goals are 
broader than the mere application of the competition rules to create a 
competitive marketplace and should also serve and foster the other 
53. For a German case considering job security in a competition case, see the merger of
Kali+Salz/PCS, Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, Verfügung vom vom 22.7.1997, IB6-220840/112, 
WuW vom 09.09.1997, Heft 09, 743 – 750. 
54. See https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/alex-chisholm-speaks-about-public-interest-
and-competition-based-merger-control (last visited July 14, 2015). 
55. ‘Mobilising competition policy tools and market expertise so that they contribute, as
appropriate, to our jobs and growth agenda. . .in this context, it will be important to keep developing an 
economic as well as a legal approach to the assessment of competition issues and to further develop 
market monitoring in support of the broader activities of the Commission’, Mission Letter to 
Commissioner for Competition, 1. November 2014, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/cwt/files/commissioner_mission_letters/vestager_en.pdf  (last 
visited July 12, 2015). 
56. See id.
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economic policy goals foreseen by the EU Commission’s agenda.57 This 
competition plus approach therefore seems to already play a major role at 
European level in competition policy enforcement. Additionally, the launch 
of the sector inquiry into the E-commerce sector shows that this 
competition approach is launched within the framework of the 
Commission’s Digital Single Market Strategy.58 Considering the above 
examples, it could be concluded that the goals of economic policy 
associated with strong and enforceable IP rights are important to create 
growth and innovation, notably in the pharmaceutical industry.59 Therefore, 
competition law is intrinsically linked to IP when it comes to creating 
growth and innovation in the economy. 
The pharma industry, for example, relies on the protection of its 
innovations via IP rights (notably patents) to justify the huge investments in 
new and innovative medicines.60 The generic competitors and the general 
interest, however, are also interested in cheaper medicines and lower 
reimbursement costs for drugs and therefore open and competitive markets. 
A competition plus approach could, therefore, consider the specificities of 
patents for the pharmaceutical industry and that certain practices are 
justified by patent law and policy considerations and should not be 
disturbed by the application of competition law. 
The ECJ’s line of thought on the balance between IP and competition 
law is to some extent revealed in the AstraZeneca judgment where the 
Court ruled that “the illegality of abusive conduct under Article [102 
TFEU] is unrelated to its compliance or non-compliance with other legal 
rules and, in the majority of cases, abuses of dominant positions consist of 
behavior which is otherwise lawful under branches of law other than 
competition law.”61 In other words, the Court tries to say that even if an 
undertaking acts lawfully under the patent rules, general law and 
administrative procedures of a member state, competition law can still 
interfere with the undertaking’s conduct if there is an abuse of competition 
law. So, even if acquiring a patent does not mean a dominant position nor 
the abuse of that dominant position, this ruling gives the impression of 
57. European Commission, The Digital Services Act: ensuring a safe and accountable online
environment, https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/digital-
services-act-ensuring-safe-and-accountable-online-environment_en (last visited January 28, 2021). 
58. European Commission, COM(2020) 842 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/TXT/?qid=1608116887159&uri=COM%3A2020%3A842%3AFIN (last visited January 28, 
2021). 
59. Carrier, supra note 45, at 764.
60. C.T. TAYLOR & Z.A. SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYSTEM: A
STUDY OF THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 251 (1973). 
61. Drexl, supra note 35, at 132.
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competition law being the ‘driving force’ in the relationship of IP and 
competition by disregarding other disciplines of law. Is competition law 
therefore the trump card in situations of conflicting tendencies? 
As regards the IP perspective, the literature has analyzed reasons for 
defensive patenting strategies and has come up with explanations such as 
the failure of patent law to restrict strategic patenting or even the failure of 
the patent system to grant a sufficient protection to the originator company 
of the patented medicine.62  Practice shows that the patent granting system 
does not always function optimally, especially in the pharmaceutical sector, 
wherein between 2000 and 2007 around 75% of the originator’s patents 
were revoked in opposition or appeal procedures.63 This could suggest that 
before a patent is granted, the patent office should more carefully analyze 
the molecule that the pharmaceutical company is seeking to patent in order 
to foresee and internalize likely competition problems. This need is 
justified by the fact that challenging the validity of a patent is motivated by 
generic companies to compete on the market. Competition law can be the 
right tool to restore competition, which is sometimes hindered by the flaws 
of the patent system.64 In this context some authors also speak of 
“probabilistic patents,”65 as there is always the danger of the patent being 
invalidated by the patent office or the court.66 
While some view competition law as a repairing tool for patent 
law,67others claim that competition law is not the right tool to address the 
failures of the patent system. Those authors fear a possible hindering of 
innovation and competition if competition law interferes with patents. 
Others draw from the case law and the evolving pattern of competition law 
enforcement that the competition rules have advanced to become a “second 
tier regulation”68 over IPRs. They are of the opinion that competition law 
62. Nicoleta Tuominen, An IP Perspective on Defensive Patenting Strategies of the EU
Pharmaceutical Industry, E.I.P.R., 541 (2012). 
63. European Commission, final Report on its competition inquiry into the pharmaceutical sector,
pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003 EC of 8 July 2009, 11. 
64. See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT:
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY INNOVATION 97 (2012) (offering a different view in the US 
context: “antitrust does not offer a global fix for problems in the patent system.”). 
65. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 ECON. PERSP. 75-98
(2005). 
66. See id.
67. Rupprecht Podszun, Can Competition Law Repair Patent Law and Administrative
Procedures?, 281-94 CML Rev. (2014); contra A. Heinemann, Immaterialgüterschutz in der 
Wettbewerbsordnung: eine grundlagenorientierte Untersuchung zum Kartellrecht des geistigen 
Eigentums 25 (Mohr Siebeck, 2002) (stating in footnote 61 that competition law is no corrective (tool) 
for intellectual property rights).   
68. STEVEN ANDERMAN & HEDVIG SCHMIDT, EU COMPETITION LAW AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS - THE REGULATION OF INNOVATION 2 (2d ed. 2011). 
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provides “an external system of regulation”69 which specifically addresses 
anticompetitive conducts that the “internal”70 IP system is incapable of 
preventing.71 It should be admitted that the circumstances for competition 
law to intervene in a patent law situation shall be narrow and specific. 
Nevertheless, if the conditions of Art. 102 TFEU are met, competition law 
can intervene and solve a market failure problem. As is evidenced by the 
Lundbeck decision of the European Commission, the view that “it will be 
very difficult to demonstrate that patent strategies are abusive, especially 
since the application of competition rules could interfere ‘with the patent 
regime itself and its very rationale” has been proven wrong72 as the 
European Commission found that the pharmaceutical undertaking 
Lundbeck had abused its dominant position in violation of Art. 102 
TFEU.73 
Just as “competition is a key driver of technical development,”74 
especially in the pharmaceutical sector, IP rights (most often in the form of 
patents) are equally the best incentive for companies to invest in R&D for 
the development of new drugs.75 Competition and IP rights can therefore 
have the positive effect of enabling innovation and progress for the market 
economy. 
It needs to be stressed that competition law is not used to challenge the 
existence as such of a patent of a pharmaceutical company.76 The UK and 
EU laws foresee procedures and the criteria under which competitors can 
challenge the validity of patents, but the existence of these rights is in a 
way immune to competition law scrutiny.77 As is clear from the Reckitt 
Benckiser decision, competition law only interferes with patent law, if the 
sphere of the lawful exercise of the patent is left and the patent holder 
69. See id. at 4.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. Tuominen, supra note 62, at 549-50.
73. Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
74. DAMIEN GERADIN, ANNE LAYNE-FARRAR, & NICOLAS PETIT, EU COMPETITION LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 34 (2012). 
75. See VALENTINE KORAH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EC COMPETITION 
RULES  2 (2006).1.2 (2006) (explaining that without the benefits and incentives of the patent, 
pharmaceutical companies would never invest in R&D for some drugs). 
76. Duncan Matthews and Olga Gurgula, Patent Strategies and Competition Law in the
Pharmaceutical Sector: Implications for Access to Medicines, Queen Mary School of Law Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 233/2016, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2779014. 
77. Tamar Khuchua, Different ‘Rules of the Game’ – Impact of National Court Systems on Patent
Litigation in the EU and the Need for New Perspectives, 10 JIPITEC 257 (2019). 
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engages in practices that are not fully covered by the patent.78 This is the 
situation in which the competition authorities in the UK and the EU suspect 
anticompetitive behavior that cannot be justified by the mere exercise of 
the existing patent. Nevertheless, it needs to be reminded that a patent is 
not equal to having a dominant position. Even if a patent is a quasi-
monopoly right granting exclusionary powers on time, there can be similar 
competing products on the market with market shares high enough to 
prevent the existence of dominant positions. But if the authority can 
establish a dominant position and identifies practices that are not normal 
competition or competition on the merits, then the abusive behavior of the 
dominant pharmaceutical company could be targeted by the competition 
rules. 
To sum up, the competition plus perspective seems to be the best-
suited approach to embrace the rationale of patent law into competition 
policy and to overcome tensions between IP and competition by achieving 
a harmonious relationship that creates innovation while safeguarding 
competitive markets in the UK and the EU. 
4. COMPATIBILITY AND INTERACTION BETWEEN TRADEMARK LAW AND
COMPETITION LAW 
The function of trademarks is to distinguish the products of one 
company from the product of another company. To fulfil this function, 
trademarks may consist of any sign that is capable of being represented 
graphically, including words, personal names, designs, letters, numbers, 
drawing, pictures, emblems, or other graphic representations capable of 
distinguishing goods or services. The registration of trademark may be 
extended unlimitedly, in principle, provided that the registration is renewed 
before expiry. 
Due to the exclusive and durable nature79 of the registration of a 
trademark, there has been a recurring concern that the protection offered by 
a trademark could by itself lead to the creation of dominant positions in the 
market. The “myth” of an association between the ownership of an IP right 
and monopoly dates back a long time.80 According to a traditional 
78. Squire Sanders Hammonds, OFT issues decision in Reckitt Benckiser abuse of dominance
investigation, Lexology (May 5, 2011), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=6ca4ee83-
bac4-4b2a-9489-b9baaf9147f5 
79. The EU trademark is registered with EUIPO and it is valid for a period of 10 years but may be
renewed indefinitely. 
80. James Turney, Defining the Limits of the EU Essential Facilities Doctrine on Intellectual
Property Rights: The Primacy of Securing Optimal Innovation, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP., 
180 (2005). 
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argument, innovators need to be rewarded for their creations with the 
exclusive right to their expected economic returns to ensure a high level of 
innovative activity.81 
Even if the process of creation of new products may at times be 
triggered by accidental discoveries or by human passion and creativity,82 it 
still holds true that, in the majority of cases, there needs to be an economic 
incentive supporting it.83 However, together with the protection afforded to 
innovators by a system of patents, copyrights and trademarks, a certain 
share of return is assigned to innovators. This share of return, albeit limited 
in time, is exclusively assigned to them. It can be quantified as the 
“difference between the competitive and the monopoly returns earned.”84 
According to this classic approach, the implications of such a rigid 
allocation of a share of return are the following: (i) that the IP right holder 
will restrict the use of its innovative product in order to gain monopoly 
profits; (ii) that the IP-protected innovation will not be duly exploited; and 
(iii) that this underutilization will produce negative externalities because
competitors, instead of exploiting the original innovation, will need to
produce substitutes whenever they consider that the cost for it is lower than
the royalties for the use of the original innovation.85
Mainly based on these considerations, there has been a tendency in 
identifying the protection afforded by IP rights with a situation of 
monopoly.86 It has also been noted that many IP textbooks use patents as 
an example of monopoly in IP rights.87 Tom Palmer called patents and 
copyrights a form of “illegitimate state-granted monopoly,” arguing that if 
patent rights had evolved under the common law similarly to trademarks, 
they would not enjoy this status of an illegitimate monopoly.88 This status, 
however, only refers to patents and copyright, because trademark rights, 
according to Palmer, are assigned to the licensor as a result of a privately 
81. Carrier, supra note 45, at 823-824.
82. FRITZ MACHLUP, THE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 162-70 (1962). 
83. See id.
84. Roger Meiners & Robert Staaf, Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks: Property or Monopoly,
13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 911, 913 (1990). 
85. See id.
86. Romano Subiotto, The Right to Deal With Whom One Pleases Under EEC Competition Law:
A Small Contribution to a Necessary Debate, 13 E.C.L.R., 244 (1992). 
87. Roger Meiners & Robert Staaf, Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks: Property or Monopoly,
13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y, 914 (1990).  
88. Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property Rights: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics
Approach, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 263, 264-68, 280 (1989). 
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negotiated agreement, instead of being constructed by statutory law.89 As 
such, they are worthy of judicial enforcement. 
While this argument is undoubtedly controversial and largely subject 
to criticism,90 it is still useful to underline the noticeably different approach 
to the interplay between trademarks and monopoly and any other IP rights. 
Interestingly, proponents contend that while the existence of a system of 
protection of intellectual property rights is necessary, patent and copyright, 
unlike property right, create scarcity, do not result from it.91 As stated by 
Plant, “the institution of private property makes for the preservation of 
scarce goods, tending . . . to lead us to make the most of them, property 
rights in patents and copyright make possible the creation of a scarcity of 
the products appropriated which could not otherwise be maintained.”92 
These observations, although disputable and in part corrected by more 
modern utilitarian theories, help identifying a distinction between on the 
one hand, the role copyrights and patents may have in the creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position in the market, and, on the other hand, 
the role of trademarks in this context. 
In order to fully understand the conflict between trademark law and 
competition law, however, it is also important to establish what are the 
functions that each of these disciplines explicates in the practice. While 
originally the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) had affirmed 
the superior importance of the goal of free circulation of goods over the 
interests of the trademark owner, stating in Van Zuylen Freres v HAG AG 
that to prohibit “the marketing in a Member State of a product legally 
bearing a trade mark in another Member State, for the sole reason that an 
identical trade mark having the same origin exists in the first state, is 
incompatible with the provisions providing for free movement of goods 
within the Common Market.”93 
This strict hierarchy was subsequently revised. In HAG II, the CJEU 
clarified that trademark rights are “an essential element in the system of 
undistorted competition which the Treaty seeks to establish and 
maintain.”94 In addition, it was underlined that “an undertaking must be in 
89. See id.
90. See generally Michael I. Krauss, Property, Monopoly, and Intellectual Rights, 12 HAMLINE L.
REV. 305 (1988-1989). Contending that patents are a combination of common law and statutory law and 
that patents, copyrights, and trademarks (intellectual property) granted recognition by the state are 
essentially the same as recognition by the state of claims in real property. 
91. Arnold Plant, The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Invention, 1 ECONOMICA 1, 30-
51 (1934); see also Palmer, supra note 88, at 279. 
92. See Plant at 31.
93. Case 192/73, Van Zuylen frères v. Hag AG, ,1974 E.C.R. 744.
94. Case C-10/89, SA CNL-SUCAL NV v. HAG GF AG, 1990 E.C.R.  I-3758. 
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a position to keep its customers by virtue of the quality of its products and 
services, something which is possible only if there are distinctive marks 
which enable customers to identify those products and services.95 
By recalling its jurisprudence in Hoffmann-La Roche v Centrafarm96 
and Centrafarm v American Home Products Corporation,97 the CJEU 
proceeded to state that the “essential function of the trade mark [sic] . . . is 
to guarantee the identity of the origin of the marked product to the 
consumer or ultimate user by enabling him without any possibility of 
confusion to distinguish that product from products which have another 
origin.”98 
Subsequently, the Trademark Directive and the Community 
Trademark Regulation entered into force.99 While they did not provide any 
indication about the hierarchy between the protection of the free circulation 
of goods and the protection of trademark rights, the provision contained in 
the tenth recital of the preamble of the Trademark Directive clarified that 
the function of registered trademarks was, in particular, to guarantee the 
trademark as an indication of origin.100 In Philips Electronics, the CJEU 
the same idea, recalling the tenth recital of the first Trademark Directive.101 
Importantly, in L’Oréal, the CJEU stated that the functions of trademark 
are multiple and that, beside the indication of the origin of the products, 
they aim at protecting the quality of products, communication, investment 
and advertising.102 
As highlighted by other authors, there does not appear to be any innate 
incompatibility between the protection of trademarks and competition law, 
and, for these intellectual property rights, the philosophical and practical 
tension existing for patents is not present.103 In particular, due to the fact 
that trademarks also have a function of identification of products, allowing 
consumers to choose between different products available in the market, 
95. See id.
96. See generally Case 102/77, Hoffman-La Roche v. Centrafarm, 1978 E.C.R. 1140. 
97. See generally Case 3/78, Centrafarm v. American Home Products Corporation, 1978 E.C.R.
1824., 
98. Case C-10/89, supra note 94, I-3758.
99. Trade Mark Regulation (EU) 2015/2424 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16
December 2015. 
100. First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the
Member States relating to trademarks, O.J (L 040) 11/02/1989, 1-7. 
101. Case C-299/99, Koninklijke Philips ElectronicsElecs., NV v. Remington Consumer Products
Ltd., 2002 E.C.R. ¶ 29. 
102. Case C-487/07, L’Oréal SA, Lancôme parfums et beauté & Cie SNC and Laboratoire Garnier
& Cie v Bellure NV, Malaika Invs., Ltd., and Starion Int’l Ltd., 2009 E.C.R. ¶ 58. 
103. STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 1357 (3rd ed. 1975).  
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they essentially spur, and do not restrain, free competition. However, even 
if the protection of trademark does not conflict with competition law in the 
same immediate way in which patent law may, a series of issues may arise 
from the fact that while trademark owners and consumers see their interests 
aligned in the prevention of material consumer confusion as to source, their 
interests may conflict in relation to other purposes of trademark law, in 
particular the avoidance of other types of confusion and the issue of 
competition.104 
As previously noted, 
trademark owners oppose competition generally. As a result, if an 
unauthorized use creates confusion of any kind, whether material or 
immaterial to consumer purchasing decisions, trademark owners will 
seize upon it and use it as an excuse to shut down an unauthorized use, 
without regard to the offsetting benefits, such as increased competition, 
the use may create. Consumers, on the other hand, are intensely 
interested in competition and the lower prices it can bring. In situations 
where another's unauthorized use of a trademark both increases 
competition and creates confusion, consumers will balance the benefits 
of increased competition against the costs of increased confusion to 
determine where their interests lie. In many cases, particularly where the 
confusion is unlikely to materially influence consumer purchasing 
decisions, consumers may favor increased competition even if it results 
in some increased confusion.105 
Due to their nature, trademarks usually do not enable their holder to 
hinder the creation of a new product, or of a new market. This is because, 
unlike copyright and patent rights, trademarks do not provide the input for 
a new product or process and, as a result, they usually do not impede the 
creation of an innovative product or of an improved process. However, they 
may create barriers to entry.106 
The ability of trademarks to operate as barriers to entry is dependent 
on the specific circumstances of the case. In particular, while it is 
undeniable that branding advertising may hinder access to the market of 
new entrants, particularly in oligopolistic markets, thus reducing the overall 
number of undertakings operating in the market, it is also true that such 
barriers to entry may have the effect of reducing the number of trademarks 
104. Glinn S. Lunney Jr., Trademarks and the Internet: The United States’ Experience, 97
TRADEMARK REP. 931, 932 (2007). 
105. See id. at 932-33.
106. THORSTEN KASEBERG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, ANTITRUST AND CUMULATIVE
INNOVATION IN THE EU AND THE US (2012). 
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used in a specific sector, aligning it with the optimal number, particularly 
when the cost of entry is very low.107 
The consistency or the divergence of goals between competition law 
and trademark protection is largely dependent on the way in which 
trademark law is used by the owner.108 The interpretation and the 
enforcement of trademark law can have a negative impact on competition 
in multiple ways. One example is the broad interpretation of the descriptive 
words used to determine the scope of the right that could prevent 
undertakings from registering trademarks for competitor products. Another 
example is the “monopolization” by means of the trademark registration of 
the common form or appearance of the product. Similarly, trademark 
protection could be misused in conjunction with the abuse of a dominant 
position in the market or, more frequently, in the case of agreements in 
which trademarks are used to restrict trade.109 Therefore, all the economic 
and legal circumstances and the relevant market must be considered, before 
it is possible to draw conclusions regarding the use of trademarks as 
anticompetitive barriers to entry.110 
In the U.S., the approach is different. In such a jurisdiction, the judge 
expressly (and preliminarily) considers whether the matter at hand involves 
a competition or a trademark issue. As an illustration, the Eleventh Circuit 
Court characterized as a purely antitrust matter the Morris v PGA case.111 
In this case, PGA had refused to grant Morris access to PGA tournaments 
unless Morris agreed not to sell the product of PGA’s proprietary RTSS-
compiled real-time golf scores to non-credentialed-third-party Internet 
publishers. Even if in principle the undertaking refused to deal with a 
competitor, the conduct was justified under competition law considerations. 
The PGA was considered to have met its business justification burden by 
showing that the aim of its conduct was to prevent the plaintiff from free 
riding on its technology. 
The Court begins its analysis with the words “Before discussing the 
antitrust issues in this case, it is important to note what this case is not 
about. Contrary to the arguments of Morris and its amici curiae, this case is 
not about copyright law, the Constitution, the First Amendment, or freedom 
107. Nicholas S. Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523, 536
(1988). 
108. Milton Handler, Trademarks and Antitrust Laws, 38 TRADEMARK REP. 387, 397 (1948).
109. LADAS, supra note 103, at 1357.
110. Apostolos Chronopoulos, Goodwill Appropriation as a Distinct Theory of Trademark
Liability: A Study on the Misappropriation Rationale in Trademark and Unfair Competition Law, 22 
Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal 253, 274 (2014). 
111. Morris Corporation v. PGA Tour, 364 F.3d 1288, (11th Cir. 2004).
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of the press in news reporting. This case is a straight-forward antitrust 
case . . . .”112 
Next, the article examines separately those violations of competition 
law that are captured by Article 101 TFEU and by Article 102 TFEU. The 
following section will look at the way in which trademark and competition 
law have been considered as conflicting in the jurisprudence of the CJEU 
in Article 101 and Article 102 TFEU cases, with the purpose of identifying 
which sets of values have been considered to prevail. 
5. THE HIERARCHY BETWEEN SETS OF RULES
5.1 Article 101 TFEU 
Article 101 TFEU is the main provision that comes into play with 
regard to trademarks because the way in which trademarks are licensed is 
by means of contractual agreements.113 By adopting licensing agreements 
undertakings allow the use of trademarks to third parties. The way in which 
these agreements are formulated, and in particular the way in which the use 
of the is limited for third parties, for instance, by means of exclusive 
licenses, may fall foul of Article 101 TFEU and give rise to competition 
concerns. 
The very first competition law case relating to trademark licenses was 
Consten and Grundig.114 Consten was a sole distributor of Grunding 
products in the territory of France and it had committed not to stock any 
competing product.115 Consten had also undertaken to sell Grundig 
products only within the territory covered by the license.116 Grunding, 
which was based in Germany and manufactured electronic products, 
assigned to Consten the registered trademark GINT in France.117 The 
complaint to the Commission was brought by a parallel importer of 
Grundig products in France, UNEF, who was accused of infringing 
Grundig’s trademark GINT.118 
The CJEU was requested to examine an appeal against a European 
Commission’s decision that had found the agreement between the exclusive 
112. See id. at 1288-1289.
113. Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union prohibits restrictive
agreements that may affect trade between Member States whose object or effect is the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market. 
114. Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Établissements Consten, S.A.R.L. v. Comm’n, 1996 E.C.R. 
115. See id. at 303.
116. See id. at 303.
117. See id. at 303.
118. See id. at 303-304.
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distributor and its supplier on the registration and the exclusive use of a 
trademark in a Member State aimed at preventing parallel imports.119 After 
having established that it is the exercise and not the existence of IP rights 
that is affected by EU law,  the CJEU considered the agreement to be 
susceptible to constitute a breach of Article 101(1) TFEU.120 
In Consten & Grundig, the CJEU established that agreements giving 
absolute territorial protection to a distributor are restrictive of competition 
by object. According to the CJEU,  
an agreement between producer and distributor which might tend to 
restore the national divisions in trade between Member States might be 
such as to frustrate the most fundamental objections of the Community. 
The Treaty, whose preamble and content aim at abolishing the barriers 
between States, and which in several provisions gives evidence of a stern 
attitude with regard to their reappearance, could not allow undertakings 
to reconstruct such barriers. Article 85(1) [now 101(1) TFEU] is 
designed to pursue this aim, even in the case of agreements between 
undertakings placed at different levels in the economic process.121 
The CJEU considered that an agreement preventing undertakings 
different from the sole distributor from importing products into the 
exclusive territory (France, in this case) and the sole distributor from 
exporting those products from the exclusive territory to other Member 
States was violating Article 101 TFEU.122 More precisely, limitations of 
this kind deriving for third parties from the registration in France by 
Consten of the GINT trademark were considered to be captured by Article 
101 TFEU.123 
With regard to the role of the trademark registration, Grundig and 
Consten submitted that the contested decision would have deprived 
Consten of the power to register the trademark in France, but the CJEU 
concluded that it was not possible to allow the trademark registration 
provided by an unlawful agreement (in that it was prohibited by 
competition law).124 Naturally, the registration in France of the GINT 
trademark was affected by the decision of the CJEU only on the basis of 
the principle of effectiveness.125 In other words, allowing Consten to use 
the trademark registration assigned to it by Grundig to achieve an 
119. See id. at 312.
120. See id. at 340.
121. See id. at 340.
122. See id. at 343.
123. See id. at 344.
124. See id. at 342.
125. See id. at 345.
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anticompetitive objective would deprive Article 101 TFEU of its 
effectiveness.126 
The parties based on Article 36 EEC, aimed at clarifying that the 
provisions on the elimination of quantitative restrictions (Articles 30 to 34 
EEC) must not be an obstacle to prohibitions or restrictions in respect of 
importation, exportation or transit which are justified, inter alia, on grounds 
of the protection of industrial and commercial property. In response, the 
CJEU clarified that the decision of the Commission did not limit the 
granting of property rights that are exclusively owned by the Member 
States. On the contrary, the decision of the Commission was aimed at 
protecting competition law, whose functioning and enforcement “does not 
allow the improper use of rights under any national trade-mark law in order 
to frustrate the Community’s law on cartels.”127 
In EMI, the CJEU established that cross-licensing of trademark is 
prohibited between competitors, because it can lead to market sharing, 
captured by Article 101.128 In EMI, the CJEU clarified how the exercise of 
a trademark right may, under specific circumstances, constitute an 
anticompetitive infringement in those cases in which it “manifests itself as 
the subject, the means, or the consequence of a restrictive practice.”129 
According to the CJEU, free movement of goods and competition law do 
not prevent owners of trademarks in all the EU Member States from 
exercising their rights in order to prevent the sale or manufacture by a third 
party in the EU of products bearing the same trademark that is owned by a 
third party in a third country.130 This conduct could, however, be prohibited 
if it was implemented through an agreement or a concerted practice with 
the object or effect of isolating or partitioning the internal market.131 
Some years after the adoption of the Consten and Grundig decision, 
the CJEU confirmed the strict and formalistic approach they adopted in 
relation to exclusivity provisions, both in the Campari and in the 
126. See id. at 345 stating that:
Although Consten is, by virtue of the registration of the GINT trade-mark, regarded under French law 
as the original holder of the rights relating to that trade-mark, the fact nevertheless remains that it was 
by virtue of an agreement with Grundig that it was able to effect the registration. That agreement 
therefore is one which may be caught by the prohibition in Article 85 (1). The prohibition would be 
ineffective if Consten could continue to use the trade-mark to achieve the same object as that pursued 
by the agreement which has been held to be unlawful. 
127. See id. at 346.
128. Case 51/75, EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS United Kingdom Ltd., 1976 E.C.R. 848.
129. See id. at ¶ 27.
130. See id. at ¶ 38.
131. See id. at ¶ 38.
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Whitbread cases.132 For the promotion of its products (alcoholic liqueurs 
used for aperitif under the international trademarks Bitter Campari and 
Cordial Campari) Campari-Milano had created a sophisticated network of 
exclusive distributors and licensees, adapting the alcoholic content and the 
quality of the ingredients according to the country of sale.133 In Campari,  
the Commission considered that certain restrictions included in an open 
exclusive trademark license, such as: 
• the exclusivity commitment whereby the licensor engaged
not to appoint other licensees or to manufacture itself the
products bearing the trademark in the allocated territory;
• a restriction on the licensees to market competing products;
• a prohibition against active sales by the licensees outside
their respective territories;
• restrictions as to the group of customers to which the licensee
engaged to supply only products manufactured by the
licensor;
could infringe Article 101(1) TFEU.134 The Commission justified its view 
by pointing out that the prohibition of engaging in active sales outside the 
allocated territories prevented Campari-Milano and its licensee from freely 
selling their manufactured products within the EU market and, as such, 
restrained competition by affecting international trade in the product.135 
The Commission, however, accepted that the restrictions could benefit 
from an individual exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU. In particular, it 
was held by the Commission that the exclusivity granted by Campari-
Milano contributed to improving the production and the distribution of the 
product. Interestingly, the Commission held that, while  
a non-competition clause in a licensing agreement concerning industrial 
property rights based on the result of a creative activity, such as a patent, 
would constitute a barrier to technical and economic progress by 
preventing the licensees form taking an interest in other techniques and 
products, this is not the case with the licensing agreements under 
consideration here. The aim pursued by the parties . . . is to decentralize 
manufacture within the EEC and to rationalize the distribution system 
linked to it, and thus to promote the sale of Campari-Milano’s Bitter, 
manufactured from the same concentrates provided by Campari-Milano, 
132. ALISON JONES AND BRENDA SUFRIN, EU COMPETITION LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS
875 (6th ed., 2016). 
133. Campari (I) (Cases IV/117, 171, 172, 856, 28.173) Commission Decision 78/253/EEC [1978]
OJ L70/69. 
134. See id. at 70-75.
135. See id. at 73-75.
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according to the same mixing process and using the same ingredients, 
and bearing the same trademark, as that of the licensor.136 
Other restrictions, such as a ban on exports outside the EU, create an 
obligation to follow the licensor’s instructions relating to the manufacture 
of the product and the quality of the ingredients, an obligation not to 
divulge the manufacturing processes to third parties, or an obligation to 
spend minimum amounts on advertising, were found to be outside the 
scope of Article 101(1) TFEU.137 Particularly, in relation to the use of the 
trademark, the Commission appeared to give consideration to the right of 
the licensor to exercise a certain degree of control over the quality of the 
products manufactured by the licensees, even if this meant that they would 
have to buy some essential raw materials from the licensor.138 Interestingly, 
the Commission also accepted that a specific group of consumers may 
require to be provided by the licensee only with products manufactured by 
the licensor, to ensure product consistency, as taste difference were likely 
to be present among different manufacturers. The Commission pointed out 
that  
even though quality standards are observed, it is impossible in particular 
to avoid differences in taste between the products of the various 
manufacturers. This obligation is thus designed to prevent these 
consumers from turning to other competing products and to ensure that 
they continue to buy Bitter Campari, with the facility of being able to 
obtain stocks from their local dealer. Further, such consumers are not 
prevented from freely obtaining the licensees’ own products even though 
any such purchase would be on the normal trading conditions applicable 
to non-duty-free purchasers.139 
On this ground, a ban on active sales outside the allocated territories 
can be justified.140 The Commission further considered that the other 3 
requirements of Article 101(3) were met. In particular, consumer benefited 
directly from the increased quantity of Bitter Campari available as a result 
of the licensing agreements and the identified restrictions of competition 
were indispensable to the attainment of said benefits. In addition, the 
licensing agreements did not eliminate competition in respect of a 
substantial part of the Bitter products.141 
136. See id. at 70.
137. See id. at 70-75.
138. See id. at 74-75.
139. See id. at 76.
140. See id. at 76.
141. See id. at 76.
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The Moosehead/Whitbread case concerned a trademark license 
agreement between Moosehead and Whitbread, a brewer of Canadian lager 
and an English brewer respectively, whereby Whitbread acquired the 
exclusive right to manufacture, promote, market, and sell the popular 
Moosehead beer brand in the UK, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man. 
Moosehead intended to penetrate the English market, but significant 
barriers to entry at the retail level prevented it from selling its Canadian 
lager directly. 142 To avert these difficulties Moosehead entered into an 
agreement with Whitbread, under which Whitbread would produce the beer 
in compliance with Moosehead’s specifications, and with Moosehead yeast 
in exchange for a royalty.143 Through a non-compete obligation Whitbread 
had an exclusive right to sell and promote beer under the ‘Moosehead’ 
trademark, that the Commission found in breach of Article 101(1) TFEU. 
However, the agreement benefited from an exemption under Article 101(3), 
because of the lively inter-brand competition present at the time in the lager 
sector in the UK.144 
Although the Commission, in adopting a very formalistic approach, 
stated clearly that certain potentially anticompetitive provisions may fall 
outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU because they are aimed at protecting 
certain interests that are considered important to safeguard.145 These 
provisions are, in particular, non-challenge clauses, confidentiality 
provisions, and provisions dealing with quality control and manufacturing 
standards,146 which immediately relate to the protection of the trademark. 
In Moosehead/Whitbread, the Commission concluded that, while non-
challenge clauses as regarding the validity of the trademark may be caught 
by Article 101 TFEU, in that case the Moosehead trademark was new to 
the UK market of lagers, and, as such, it would not constitute an 
appreciable barrier to entry for any newcomers.147 
In following case, the CJEU adopted a less lenient approach and 
focused on the potential that the exercise of trademark rights has to 
contribute to the division of markets and therefore to hamper the freedom 
of movement of goods, that is a fundamental staple of the EU internal 
market. The potential conflict, and the lesser importance of trademark had 
already been noted by the CJEU in Sirena Srl. v Eda: 
142. Moosehead/Whitbread (IV/32.736) Commission Decision 90/186/EEC OJ L 100, 20.4.1990.
143. See id at 33.
144. See id. at 36-37.
145. See id. at 37.
146. JONES AND SUFRIN, supra note 132, at 878.
147. See Moosehead/Whitbread supra note 142, at 36.
2021 CAN COMPETITION CONSIDERATIONS TRUMP TRADEMARKS RIGHTS? 117 
The exercise of a trade-mark right is particularly apt to lead to a 
partitioning of markets, and thus to impair the free movement of goods 
between States which is essential to the Common Market. Moreover, a 
trade-mark right is distinguishable in this context from other rights of 
industrial and commercial property, inasmuch as the interests protected 
by the latter are usually more important, and merit a higher degree of 
protection, than the interests protected by an ordinary trade-mark.148 
In Sirena, the CJEU went further and identified all theoretical 
circumstances in which the exercise of trademark rights could constitute an 
infringement of Article 101 TFEU.149 According to the CJEU, a situation 
of conflict between the exercise of trademarks and competition law was 
likely to arise  
from restrictive agreements between proprietors of trade-marks or their 
successors in title enabling them to prevent imports from other Member 
States. If the combination of assignments to different users of national 
trade-marks protecting the same product has the result of re-enacting 
impenetrable frontiers between the Member States, such practice may 
well affect trade between States, and distort competition in the Common 
Market. The matter would be different if, in order to avoid any 
partitioning of the market, the agreements concerning the use of national 
rights in respect of the same trade-mark were to be effected in such 
conditions as to make the general use of trade-mark rights as Community 
level compatible with the observance of the conditions of competition 
and unity of the market which are so essential to the Common Market 
that failure to observe them is penalized by Article 85 [now Article 101 
TFEU] by a declaration that they are automatically void.150 
Later on, the CJEU adopted a softer approach to assignments of 
trademarks to undertakings operating in different Member States.151 While 
this practice has undoubtedly the potential to compartmentalize the market, 
the Court clarified in IHT v Ideal-standard that in order to determine 
whether a trademark assignment could be treated as having an 
anticompetitive effect, it is necessary to look at the context, by taking into 
consideration the commitment underlying the assignment, the intention of 
the parties and the consideration for the assignment.152 
In Nungesser, the CJEU reaffirmed the position adopted in Consten 
and Grundig,153 according to which the granting of absolute territorial 
148. Case 40/70 Sirena S.R.L. v. Eda S.R.L., 1971 E.C.R. ¶ 7.
149. See id. at ¶ 9.
150. See id. at ¶ 10.
151. Case C-9/93, IHT Internationale Heiztechnik v. Ideal-Standard, 1994 E.C.R.
152. See id. at ¶ 59.
153. See Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, supra note 114.
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protection to a licensee to enable the control and prevention of parallel 
imports leads to compartmentalization of national markets, contrary to the 
gist of the EU Treaties.154 The CJEU confirmed the lack of the conditions 
to grant an exemption, claiming that the indispensability of the restriction 
for the improvement of production or distribution of the product had not 
been demonstrated.155 
In the Pronuptia de Paris preliminary ruling, the CJEU was requested, 
by an order of the Bundesgerichtshof Frankfurt am Main, to assess whether 
certain categories of exclusive dealing agreements could be included in 
franchise agreement or whether they violated Article 101 TFEU.156 The 
franchisor, Pronuptia de Paris GmbH, Frankfurt am Main, a subsidiary of a 
homonymous French company, had concluded three franchising 
agreements with the franchisee Mrs. Schillgalis, licensing to her the 
trademark for the sale of wedding dresses and other items of clothing 
especially created for marital celebrations, and covering three different 
territories (Hamburg, Oldenburg and Hanover). With the conclusion of the 
franchising agreements, the franchisor granted the franchisee, in respect of 
the territories, the exclusive right to use the trade-mark “Pronuptia de 
Paris” for the marketing of her goods and services and the right to 
advertise; undertook not to open any other Pronuptia shops in the assigned 
territories or to provide goods or services to third parties in those 
territories; while the franchisee committed to sell the goods, using the trade 
name and trade-mark “Pronuptia de Paris”, to purchase from the franchisor 
80% of wedding dresses and accessories, together with a proportion of 
cocktail and evening dresses to be set by the franchisee herself, and to 
purchase the remainder only from suppliers approved by the franchisor, to 
advertise in the territories only with the franchisor's agreement, and in any 
event to harmonize that advertising with the franchisor's international and 
national advertising, to distribute catalogues and other publicity material 
provided by the franchisor to the best of her abilities and in general to 
apply the business methods imparted to her by the franchisor. 
A franchising agreement is aimed at creating a network of vertical 
agreements which ensures that certain standards in the distribution of the 
products are respected. This network, however, tends to strengthen the 
franchisor’s competitive power at the horizontal level, because it provides 
it with a strong brand vouching for its reliability and quality.157 According 
154. Case 258/78, L.C. Nungesser v. Comm’n, 1982 E.C.R. ¶ 61.
155. See id. at ¶ 77.
156. Case 161/84, Pronuptia de Paris v. Pronuptia,1986 E.C.R.
157. See id. at 379-380.
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to the franchisor in this case, to ensure the operation of this agreement, 
certain legal clauses are essential: exclusive delivery and supply 
obligations, because they allow to maintain a standard selection of goods in 
the stores; uniform advertising and shop layout, because they reinforce the 
credibility of the franchisee without harming the image of the franchisor; 
and prohibition to sell goods supplied under the franchising agreement in 
other shops.158 These clauses, by their very nature, seem to be necessary 
for the normal operation of the franchising agreement and could be 
excluded by the scope of Article 101 TFEU.159 
The CJEU focused on the clauses that were susceptible to 
compartmentalize the market and found that the clause prohibiting the 
franchisee from opening another Pronuptia shop combined with the clause 
granting the franchisee, in respect of the territories, the exclusive right to 
use the trademark “Pronuptia de Paris” for the marketing of goods and 
services and the right to advertise could result in a market sharing practice 
and in a restriction of competition within the network of franchisee.160 
Such practice could possibly prevent other franchisee from establishing 
themselves in other Member States, thus affecting trade between Member 
States. This case suggests a changed approach on the part of the CJEU in 
the prioritization of the protection of competition law interests over the 
safeguard of trademark rights. Agreements aimed at protecting the know-
how of the franchisor and the reputation and uniformity of the franchise are 
prima facie compatible with Article 101(1) TFEU.161 
Another important intersection between trademarks and Article 101 
TFEU occurs with regard to trademark delimitation agreements or 
trademark settlements, whereby the owners of trademarks capable of being 
confused enter into agreements reciprocally limiting the use of their 
respective trademark. In BAT, BAT Cigaretten-Fabriken GmbH, holder of 
the Dorcet trademark in Germany, claimed that the trademark ‘Toltecs’ 
belonging to the Dutch exporter of cut tobacco Sergers was confusingly 
similar to his trademark.162 The two companies settled their dispute by 
putting a quantitative limit to the types of tobacco that Sergers could export 
to Germany under the Toltecs trademark.163 In addition, the distributors 
used by Sergers were to be approved by BAT.164 Subsequently, difficulties 
158. See id. at 376.
159. See id. at 379.
160. See id at 383-384.
161. See id. at 383.
162. Case 35/83, BAT Cigaretten-Fabriken v. Comm’n, 1985 E.C.R. 375. 
163. See id. at 380.
164. See id.
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arose in the approval of distributors for Germany by BAT and Sergers 
submitted a complaint to the Commission.165 
The CJEU upheld the Commission decision with regard to the 
ambivalent nature of delimitation agreements, considering that they may be 
lawful if they are aimed at allocating the ambit of operation of different 
trademarks in the interest of the parties and are intended to avoid confusion 
or controversy between them.166 However, such agreements, like any other, 
are subject to the scrutiny of the European Commission under Article 101 
TFEU, in particular because they can be conducive to the partitioning of 
market or other restrictions of competition.167 
The confirmation that the agreement could restrain competition was 
also based, according to the Commission, on the observation that 
Segers is the proprietor of a trade mark legally acquired and used in a 
Member State and BAT . . . is the proprietor of an unused, dormant, 
trade mark which is liable to be removed from the register upon 
application by any interested party. BAT’s opposition, as part of its 
efforts to control the distribution of Segers’ products, constitutes an 
abuse of the rights conferred upon it by its trade mark ownership.168 
From subsequent case law, it appears that the Commission tend to 
consider that delimitation agreements are outside the scope of Article 
101(1) in those cases where there is a genuine risk of confusion between 
the parties and the agreements do not have the effect of segmenting the 
internal market.169 
5.2 Article 102 TFEU 
The other way in which a clash between competition law and 
trademarks may arise is in the case of an abuse of a dominant position.170 
While cases of exploitation of a dominant position granted by an IP right 
have been very common (Bronner,171 Magill,172 Microsoft173), the use of a 
165. See id at 376.
166. See id. at 380. 
167. See id. 385.
168. See id. at 385-386.
169. See Sirdar-Phildar (IV/27.879) Commission Decision 75/297/EEC OJ L 125, 16.5.1975, p.
27–30. 
170. Article 102 TFEU prohibits any abuse of dominant position that affect trade between Member
States. 
171. Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint, 1998 E.C.R. I-7817.
172. Magill TV Guide/ITP, BBC and RTE (IV/31.851) Commission Decision 89/205/EEC [1988]
OJ L 78, 21.3.1989, p. 43–51. 
173. Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Comm’n, 2007, E.C.R. II-3619.
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trademark in this specific sense has been less typical than in Article 101 
TFEU cases. 
The most topical cases of refusal to license and refusal to provide 
interoperability relate to patents, where the dominant undertaking has the 
most significant share of market and makes use of such market power to 
foreclose competitors or increase prices.174 The use of a trademark to 
artificially create barriers to entry in a market that is already dominated by 
an undertaking seems to have been less frequent in reality.175 
In a seminal decision relating to patents in Parke Davis, the CJEU 
restated the Grundig & Consten principle according to which the nature 
and the function of community law on competition do not permit rights 
arising under national trademark law to be improperly exercised so as to 
render Community law on cartels ineffective.176 In particular, the CJEU 
extended the reasoning elaborated in relation to Article 101 TFEU in 
Consten & Gruding, adapting to the framework of Article 102 TFEU and 
underlying the importance of distinguishing between the holding of an IP 
right and its exercise.177 
In Sirena v Eda, the CJEU recalled the theoretical circumstances in 
which the exercise of a trademark right is liable to be found incompatible 
with Article 102 TFEU.178 It stated that the provision on abuse of 
dominance required the three specific conditions of the existence of a 
dominant position, its abuse, and the possibility that trade between Member 
States may be affected.179 Additionally, the CJEU explained that the first 
requirement was not met merely because of the ownership of a trademark 
or because the owner was entitled to prevent third parties from producing 
or distributing products bearing the same trademark in the territory of a 
Member State.180 The CJEU also specified that “as regards the abuse of a 
dominant position, although the price level of the product may not of itself 
necessarily suffice to disclose such an abuse, it may, however, if unjustified 
174. Case 24/67, Parke, Davis and Co. v Probel, Reese, Beintema-Interpharm and Centrafarm,
1968 E.C.R. 55. 
175. Sven Bostyn and Nicolas Petit, Patent=Monopoly: A Legal Fiction (December 31,2013).
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract-2373471 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2373471. 
176. See id. at 65.
177. Aashit Shah, The Abuse of Dominant Position” under Article 82 of the Treaty of the
European Community: Impact on Licensing of Intellectual Property Rights, 3 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 41, 47 (2003). 
178. Case 40/70, supra note 148, at ¶15. 
179. See id. at ¶ 15.
180. See id. at ¶ 16.
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by any objective criteria, and if it is particularly high, be a determining 
factor.”181 
On the issue of the relation between the holding of a trademark and 
the holding of a dominant position in the market, the CJEU clarified in EMI 
that 
Although the trade mark right confers upon its proprietor a special 
position within the protected territory this, however, does not imply the 
existence of a dominant position within the meaning of [Article 86] (now 
102 TFEU), in particular where, as in the present case, several 
undertakings whose economic strength is comparable to that of the 
proprietor of the mark operate in the market for the products in question 
and are in a position to compete with the said proprietor.182 
The Court also restated the lack of correlation between being the 
holder of a trademark and being able to commit an infringement of 
competition law.183 In Hoffman v. Centrafarm, the CJEU was requested to 
clarify whether the person entitled to a trademark right protected both in 
Member State A and in Member State B. It was unclear if this situation 
could prevent a parallel importer from: (i) buying from the proprietor of the 
mark or with his consent in Member State A of the Community medicinal 
preparations, and (ii) from providing them with new packaging, affixing to 
such packaging the proprietor's trademark and importing the preparations 
distinguished in this manner into Member State B.184 The CJEU was also 
requested to clarify whether this conduct is to be deemed an abuse of a 
dominant position under Article 102 TFEU.185 
The Court ruled that the described conduct, although not prohibited 
per se, may constitute an abuse of a dominant position if (1) the use of the 
trademark right by the proprietor will contribute to the artificial partitioning 
of the markets between Member States; (2) the repackaging cannot 
adversely affect the original condition of the product; (3) the proprietor of 
the mark receives prior notice of the marketing of the repackaged product; 
and (4) it is stated on the new packaging by whom the product has been 
repackaged.186 According to the Court: 
to the extent to which the exercise of a trademark right is lawful in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 36 of the Treaty, such exercise 
is not contrary to Article 86 of the Treaty on the sole ground that it is act 
181. See id. at ¶ 17.
182. Case 51/75, supra note 74, at 849. 
183. See id. at 847.
184. Case 102/77, supra note 56, at 1163.
185. See id. at 1167.
186. See id. at 1165.
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of an undertaking occupying a dominant position on the market if the 
trademark right has not been used as an instrument for the abuse of such 
a position.187 
In Volvo v Veng, the CJEU examined a case concerning a substantial 
car manufacturer holding registered designs, which conferred on it the 
exclusive right to make and import replacement body panels required to 
affect repair of the body of a car that it manufactured.188 After restating that 
it is for the national law system to determine the terms and conditions of 
the protection of designs and models, the Court proceeded to address the 
question of whether it is a prima facie abuse of a dominant position to 
refuse to license others to supply the body parts incorporating the design, 
even in the event that they are willing to pay reasonable royalties.189 The 
Court concluded that the conduct is not in itself an abuse of dominant 
position. The following conducts could have been identified as violating 
Article 86, now 102 TFEU, according to the CJEU: “the arbitrary refusal to 
supply spare parts to independent repairers, the fixing of prices for spare 
parts at an unfair level or a decision no longer to produce spare parts for a 
particular model even though many cars of that model are still in 
circulation, provided that such conduct is liable to affect trade between 
Member States.”190 
In Der Grüne Punkt,  Duales System Deutschland provided a 
managing packaging collection service for recycling.191  On 12 June 1991, 
the German Government adopted an Ordinance limiting the environmental 
impact of packaging waste, providing for manufacturers and distributors of 
packaging to take back and recover used sales packaging outside the public 
waste disposal system free of charge.192 By entering into an agreement with 
Duales System Deutschland, manufacturers and distributors could, in return 
for a fee, display the “Der Grüne Punkt” logo on the packaging covered by 
the recycling system that Duales System Deutschland managed. Duales 
System Deutschland had registered the “Der Grüne Punkt” logo in 
Germany:193 
187. Case102/77, supra note 56, at 1167.
188. Case 238/87, AB Volvo v Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., 1988 E.C.R. 6232.
189. See id. at ¶ 2.
190. See id. at ¶ 9.
191. Case C-385/07 P, Der Grüne Punkt – Duales System Deutschland v Commission, 2009
E.C.R. I-06155.
192. See id. at ¶ 2.
193. See id. at ¶ 9.
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According to the Commission decision, Duales System Deutschland 
enjoyed a dominant position, being the only company to offer its service 
(the “exemption system”) in Germany, collecting around 70% of sales 
packaging in Germany and around 82% of sales packaging from final 
consumers in Germany.194 The Commission determined that Duales 
System Deutschland abused its dominant position based on the fact that the 
fee charged by Duales System Deutschland to manufacturers and 
distributors participating in the DSD system was tied “not to the actual use 
of that system but is calculated on the basis of the number of packages 
bearing the DGP logo which those manufacturers and distributors put into 
circulation in Germany.”195 By requiring manufacturers and distributors 
participating in the DSD system to affix the DGP logo to all packaging 
notified to DSD and intended for consumption in Germany, Duales System 
Deutschland exploited its dominant position in the market.196 The 
investigation carried out by the Commission led to the conclusion that the 
method of calculation of the fee paid to DSD constituted an obstacle to the 
desire of certain packaging manufacturers, who were customers of the DSD 
system, to be able to make use of their own self-management solution or of 
another exemption system in respect to some of the packaging put into 
circulation by them, thus depriving them of any choice. 
The Court of First Instance, upheld by the CJEU, considered that the 
conduct of DSD consisting in asking for payment of a fee for all packaging 
bearing the DGP logo and put into circulation in Germany, even where 
customers of the company showed that they do not use the DGP system for 
some or all of that packaging, was an abuse of a dominant position.197 
6. INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION: COMPETITION AS A “SILENT”
CONSIDERATION 
In defining the relationship between competition law and trademarks, 
the CJEU consistently refused to accept that the specific function of 
trademark (in particular, guaranteeing the origin of the product for the 
consumers) could “provide an immunity from unwarrantable interference 
when its exercise was contrary to Article 101.”198 The same reasoning is 
194. See id. at ¶ 29.
195. See id. at ¶ 30. 
196. See id.
197. See id. at ¶ 143.
198. ANDERMAN & SCHMIDT, supra note 68, at 24.
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also valid for the application of Article 102 TFEU.199 In other words, as it 
appears from the above analysis that the CJEU has been very respectful 
both of trademark right and of the need to protect competition law. 
As it emerges from the above analysis, considerations relating to the 
protection or the fostering of innovation are entirely missing in relation to 
trademarks. In relation to trademarks, the CJEU has moved from a very 
strict approach in a first body of case law, where the logic of the protection 
of the freedom of circulation of goods have been considered prevalent, to a 
more relaxed approach. Simultaneously, the CJEU has shown an increased 
consideration for the interests of the trademark owner and admitted the 
possibility that specific clauses aimed at the protection of know-how or the 
reputation and uniformity of the distribution could be considered 
compatible with Article 101(1) TFEU.200 
In the first years of the establishment of the European Community, 
competition law tended to suspiciously view the protection of trademark, 
seeing it as directly opposed to the goals of competition law.201 This view 
has been abandoned and substituted by a more synthetic approach in which 
the goals of trademark law and competition law are not incompatible but 
may be pursued conjunctly.  Whenever requested to strike a balance 
between trademarks and competition law, the CJEU has proceeded to 
identify whether an infringement of competition law stricto sensu had been 
committed by means of the exercise of a trademark right.202 All the factual 
and economic circumstances of the case were given consideration to allow 
the judge to identify whether the trademark protection or the competition 
law considerations should prevail.203 The shift towards a more careful 
consideration for the protection of the trademark owner has also 
historically coincided with a more accomplished internal market, in which 
the goal of the protection of the freedom of circulation of good has become 
a less pressing one, with the result that that aim was no longer the most 
prominent one in guiding the reasoning of the CJEU.204 
The CJEU also moved towards a more thorough consideration of the 
legal and economic context, and, importantly, a more economic-oriented 
analysis of the potential competition restriction.205 In the Viking Gas case, 
the CJEU considered that a balance was to be found between the interest on 
199. Shah, supra note 177, at 47.
200. See case 161/84, supra note 156, at 383.
201. See Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, supra note 114, at 340.
202. See id.
203. See Campari cases, supra note 133, at 70.
204. See case 51/75, supra note 128, at ¶ 30. 
205. See case C-385/07, supra note 191, at ¶ 30.
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the part of the licensee of the trademark constituted by the shape of a 
composite bottle and the owner of the trademarks affixed to that bottle, 
and, on the other hand, the interest of the purchasers of those bottles to 
fully enjoy their property rights in those bottles and, aligned to this latter, 
the general interest in maintaining undistorted competition.206 The CJEU, 
after restating that the sale of the bottle, by realizing the economic value of 
the trademark, exhausts the exclusive rights to that trademark,207 considered 
the interests of the consumers and the market. 
While it is very common that the full enjoyment of a property right is 
limited by a related trademark rights, the CJEU noted that to allow the 
licensee of the trademark right constituted by the shape of the composite 
bottle and proprietor of the marks affixed to that bottle to prevent, on the 
basis of the rights relating to those marks, the bottles from being refilled 
would unduly reduce competition on the downstream market for the 
refilling of gas bottles, and would even create the risk of that market’s 
being closed off if the licensee and proprietor were to succeed in imposing 
its bottle because of its specific technical characteristics, the protection of 
which is not the purpose of trademark law.208 That risk is, moreover, 
increased by virtue of the fact that the cost of the composite bottle is much 
more than the gas and that the purchaser, in order to regain a free choice of 
gas supplier, would have to forgo the initial outlay made in purchasing the 
bottle, the recouping of which requires the bottle to be reused a sufficient 
number of times.209 By looking at the consequences on the market, the 
CJEU concluded that the sale of the composite bottle must be considered to 
exhausts the rights of the licensee.210 
Competition considerations guide the decision of the CJEU in matter 
that are almost exclusively hinging upon trademark law. While in 
competition law cases, the progressively more evident presence of 
trademark considerations is apparent, this is not the case in the trademark 
jurisprudence, where competition law consideration remains silent, or at 
least very indirectly address in the reasoning. 
As it has been showed above, the “internalization” of competition law 
considerations when dealing with trademark issues and vice versa certainly 
affects the reasoning of the Court of Justice.211 The choice of considering 
one issue from the point of view of either trademark law or competition law 
206. Case C-46/10, Viking Gas v. Kosan Gas, EU:C:2011:485, ¶31. 
207. See id. at ¶ 32.
208. See id. at ¶ 34.
209. See id. at ¶ 34.
210. See id. at ¶ 35.
211. See id. at ¶ 35.
2021 CAN COMPETITION CONSIDERATIONS TRUMP TRADEMARKS RIGHTS? 127 
empowers the CJEU to address the same issue in a completely different 
manner and come to a different conclusion. It remains to be assessed 
whether, in future cases, the characterization of a case as an IP or a 
competition law case by the CJEU will also have a bearing, given the 
profound consequences for the structure of the analysis that is performed 
by the adjudicator, and, in turn, on the final outcome of the case of such a 
choice. 
